github.com/cloudwan/edgelq-sdk@v1.15.4/iam/proto/v1/attestation_custom.proto

syntax = "proto3";

package ntt.iam.v1;

import "edgelq-sdk/iam/proto/v1/attestation_domain.proto";
import "edgelq-sdk/iam/proto/v1/attestation_domain_change.proto";
import "edgelq-sdk/iam/proto/v1/common.proto";

option go_package = "github.com/cloudwan/edgelq-sdk/iam/client/v1/attestation;attestation_client";
option java_multiple_files = false;
option java_outer_classname = "AttestationCustomProto";
option java_package = "com.ntt.iam.pb.v1";

// Request message for method [Verify][ntt.iam.v1.Verify]
message VerifyRequest {
  oneof msg {
    AskForChallenge ask_for_challenge = 1;

    ChallengeResponse challenge_response = 2;
  }

  message AskForChallenge {
    // This will be used to set "sub" claim for attestation token.
    // This "sub" should be compared to "sub" of JWT access token during
    // validation. "Sub" comparison ties both tokens together and protects
    // against theft/reuse of one of them by another service account.
    string subject = 1;

    // attestation domain ref
    string attestation_domain = 2;

    TpmVersion tpm_version = 3;

    // PKIX encoded EK public
    bytes ekpub = 4;

    // ASN.1 DER encoded EK certificate.
    bytes ekcert = 5;

    // For Intel TPMs, Intel hosts certificates at a public URL derived from the
    // Public key. Clients or servers can perform an HTTP GET to this URL, and
    // use ParseEKCertificate on the response body.
    string ekcerturl = 6;

    // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-2-TPM-Structures_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
    // https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Rev-2.0-Part-2-Structures-01.38.pdf
    // TPMT_PUBLIC (TPM 2.0) or TPM_PUBKEY (TPM 1.2)
    bytes akpub = 7;

    // TPMS_CREATION_DATA
    bytes creation_data = 8;

    // TPMS_ATTEST
    bytes attest = 9;

    // TPMT_SIGNATURE
    bytes signature = 10;

    // ChallengeFormat defines the method of generating identity activation
    // challenge by the Verifier (server). It should affect the interpretation
    // ChallengeResponse fields cred_encrypted_by_ekpub and
    // secret_encrypted_by_cred. Attestor (client) is responsible for chosing
    // the right format depending on TPM version and the presence of TrouSerS
    // daemon.
    ChallengeFormat challenge_format = 11;

    enum ChallengeFormat {
      // Credential Protection as defined in section 24 of the TPM specification
      // revision 2 part 1 See:
      // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/
      // Returned primitives are of type TPM2B_ID_OBJECT and
      // TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET.
      // NOTE: ECC is not supported.
      //
      // Reference implementation:
      //  github.com/google/go-attestation@v0.3.2/attest/activation.go:generateChallengeTPM20,
      //  which uses
      //  github.com/google/go-tmp@v0.3.2/tmp2/credactivation/credential_activation.go:Generate
      TPM20_CREDENTIAL = 0;

      // Challenge as defined in section 15.1 of the TPM 1.2 commands spec
      // See:
      // https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TPM-Main-Part-3-Commands_v1.2_rev116_01032011.pdf
      // Returned primitives are of type TPM12_EKBLOB (with
      // TPM_EK_BLOB_ACTIVATE) and bytes.
      //
      // Reference implementation:
      //  github.com/google/go-attestation@v0.3.2/attest/activation.go:generateChallengeTPM12,
      //  which uses
      //  github.com/google/go-attestation@v0.3.2/attest/challenge.go:generateChallenge12
      TPM12_EKBLOB = 1;

      // TSPI_EKBLOB is a TPM1.2 challenge format accepted by TrouSerS daemon's
      // Tspi_TPM_ActivateIdentity function. As far as I can tell, it's not
      // documented except in the code. Returned primitives are of type
      // TPM12_EKBLOB (with TPM_EK_BLOB_ACTIVATE) and bytes.
      //
      // Reference implementation:
      //  github.com/google/go-attestation@v0.3.2/attest/activation.go:generateChallengeTPM12,
      //  which uses
      //  github.com/google/go-tspi@v0.3.0/verification/verification.go:GenerateChallengeEx
      TSPI_EKBLOB = 2;
    }
  }

  message ChallengeResponse {
    bytes ak_activation_decrypted_secret = 1;

    repeated Quote quotes = 2;

    repeated PCR pcrs = 3;

    // Binary contents of /sys/kernel/security/tpm0/binary_bios_measurements
    bytes eventlog = 4;

    message Quote {
      // TPMS_ATTEST (TSS_VALIDATION.Data or TSS_VALIDATION.rgbData)
      // This contains PCR selection information for which the signature was
      // calculated and other required data, like nonce.
      bytes quote = 1;

      // TSS_VALIDATION.ValidationData or TSS_VALIDATION.rgbValidationData
      bytes signature = 2;
    }
  }
}

// Response message for method [Verify][ntt.iam.v1.Verify]
message VerifyResponse {
  oneof msg {
    Challenge challenge = 1;

    AttestationSuccessful attestation_successful = 2;
  }

  message Challenge {
    // Platform attestation
    bytes platform_attestation_nonce = 1;

    // AK Identity Activation
    bytes cred_encrypted_by_ekpub = 2;

    bytes secret_encrypted_by_cred = 3;
  }

  message AttestationSuccessful { string attestation_token = 1; }
}