github.com/hxx258456/ccgo@v0.0.5-0.20230213014102-48b35f46f66f/sm4/sm4ni_gcm_asm.go (about) 1 //go:build amd64 || arm64 2 // +build amd64 arm64 3 4 package sm4 5 6 import ( 7 "crypto/cipher" 8 goSubtle "crypto/subtle" 9 10 "github.com/hxx258456/ccgo/internal/subtle" 11 ) 12 13 //go:noescape 14 //goland:noinspection GoUnusedParameter 15 func gcmSm4niEnc(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, rk []uint32) 16 17 //go:noescape 18 //goland:noinspection GoUnusedParameter 19 func gcmSm4niDec(productTable *[256]byte, dst, src []byte, ctr, T *[16]byte, rk []uint32) 20 21 // sm4CipherNIGCM implements crypto/cipher.gcmAble so that crypto/cipher.NewGCM 22 // will use the optimised implementation in this file when possible. Instances 23 // of this type only exist when hasGCMAsm and hasSM4 returns true. 24 type sm4CipherNIGCM struct { 25 *sm4CipherNI 26 } 27 28 // Assert that sm4CipherNIGCM implements the gcmAble interface. 29 var _ gcmAble = (*sm4CipherNIGCM)(nil) 30 31 type gcmNI struct { 32 cipher *sm4CipherNI 33 nonceSize int 34 tagSize int 35 bytesProductTable [256]byte 36 } 37 38 func (g *gcmNI) NonceSize() int { 39 return g.nonceSize 40 } 41 42 func (g *gcmNI) Overhead() int { 43 return g.tagSize 44 } 45 46 // NewGCM returns the SM4 cipher wrapped in Galois Counter Mode. This is only 47 // called by crypto/cipher.NewGCM via the gcmAble interface. 48 func (c *sm4CipherNIGCM) NewGCM(nonceSize, tagSize int) (cipher.AEAD, error) { 49 g := &gcmNI{} 50 g.cipher = c.sm4CipherNI 51 g.nonceSize = nonceSize 52 g.tagSize = tagSize 53 gcmSm4Init(&g.bytesProductTable, g.cipher.enc, INST_SM4) 54 return g, nil 55 } 56 57 // Seal encrypts and authenticates plaintext. See the cipher.AEAD interface for 58 // details. 59 func (g *gcmNI) Seal(dst, nonce, plaintext, data []byte) []byte { 60 if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize { 61 panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM") 62 } 63 if uint64(len(plaintext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*BlockSize { 64 panic("cipher: message too large for GCM") 65 } 66 67 var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte 68 69 if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize { 70 // Init counter to nonce||1 71 copy(counter[:], nonce) 72 counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1 73 } else { 74 // Otherwise counter = GHASH(nonce) 75 gcmSm4Data(&g.bytesProductTable, nonce, &counter) 76 gcmSm4Finish(&g.bytesProductTable, &tagMask, &counter, uint64(len(nonce)), uint64(0)) 77 } 78 79 g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:]) 80 81 var tagOut [gcmTagSize]byte 82 gcmSm4Data(&g.bytesProductTable, data, &tagOut) 83 84 ret, out := subtle.SliceForAppend(dst, len(plaintext)+g.tagSize) 85 if subtle.InexactOverlap(out[:len(plaintext)], plaintext) { 86 panic("cipher: invalid buffer overlap") 87 } 88 89 if len(plaintext) > 0 { 90 gcmSm4niEnc(&g.bytesProductTable, out, plaintext, &counter, &tagOut, g.cipher.enc) 91 } 92 gcmSm4Finish(&g.bytesProductTable, &tagMask, &tagOut, uint64(len(plaintext)), uint64(len(data))) 93 copy(out[len(plaintext):], tagOut[:]) 94 95 return ret 96 } 97 98 // Open authenticates and decrypts ciphertext. See the cipher.AEAD interface 99 // for details. 100 func (g *gcmNI) Open(dst, nonce, ciphertext, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { 101 if len(nonce) != g.nonceSize { 102 panic("cipher: incorrect nonce length given to GCM") 103 } 104 // Sanity check to prevent the authentication from always succeeding if an implementation 105 // leaves tagSize uninitialized, for example. 106 if g.tagSize < gcmMinimumTagSize { 107 panic("cipher: incorrect GCM tag size") 108 } 109 110 if len(ciphertext) < g.tagSize { 111 return nil, errOpen 112 } 113 if uint64(len(ciphertext)) > ((1<<32)-2)*uint64(BlockSize)+uint64(g.tagSize) { 114 return nil, errOpen 115 } 116 117 tag := ciphertext[len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize:] 118 ciphertext = ciphertext[:len(ciphertext)-g.tagSize] 119 120 // See GCM spec, section 7.1. 121 var counter, tagMask [gcmBlockSize]byte 122 123 if len(nonce) == gcmStandardNonceSize { 124 // Init counter to nonce||1 125 copy(counter[:], nonce) 126 counter[gcmBlockSize-1] = 1 127 } else { 128 // Otherwise counter = GHASH(nonce) 129 gcmSm4Data(&g.bytesProductTable, nonce, &counter) 130 gcmSm4Finish(&g.bytesProductTable, &tagMask, &counter, uint64(len(nonce)), uint64(0)) 131 } 132 133 g.cipher.Encrypt(tagMask[:], counter[:]) 134 135 var expectedTag [gcmTagSize]byte 136 gcmSm4Data(&g.bytesProductTable, data, &expectedTag) 137 138 ret, out := subtle.SliceForAppend(dst, len(ciphertext)) 139 if subtle.InexactOverlap(out, ciphertext) { 140 panic("cipher: invalid buffer overlap") 141 } 142 if len(ciphertext) > 0 { 143 gcmSm4niDec(&g.bytesProductTable, out, ciphertext, &counter, &expectedTag, g.cipher.enc) 144 } 145 gcmSm4Finish(&g.bytesProductTable, &tagMask, &expectedTag, uint64(len(ciphertext)), uint64(len(data))) 146 147 if goSubtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expectedTag[:g.tagSize], tag) != 1 { 148 for i := range out { 149 out[i] = 0 150 } 151 return nil, errOpen 152 } 153 return ret, nil 154 }