github.com/twelsh-aw/go/src@v0.0.0-20230516233729-a56fe86a7c81/crypto/rsa/pkcs1v15.go

// Copyright 2009 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.

package rsa

import (
	"crypto"
	"crypto/internal/boring"
	"crypto/internal/randutil"
	"crypto/subtle"
	"errors"
	"io"
)

// This file implements encryption and decryption using PKCS #1 v1.5 padding.

// PKCS1v15DecryptOptions is for passing options to PKCS #1 v1.5 decryption using
// the crypto.Decrypter interface.
type PKCS1v15DecryptOptions struct {
	// SessionKeyLen is the length of the session key that is being
	// decrypted. If not zero, then a padding error during decryption will
	// cause a random plaintext of this length to be returned rather than
	// an error. These alternatives happen in constant time.
	SessionKeyLen int
}

// EncryptPKCS1v15 encrypts the given message with RSA and the padding
// scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5.  The message must be no longer than the
// length of the public modulus minus 11 bytes.
//
// The random parameter is used as a source of entropy to ensure that
// encrypting the same message twice doesn't result in the same
// ciphertext.
//
// WARNING: use of this function to encrypt plaintexts other than
// session keys is dangerous. Use RSA OAEP in new protocols.
func EncryptPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, pub *PublicKey, msg []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	randutil.MaybeReadByte(random)

	if err := checkPub(pub); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	k := pub.Size()
	if len(msg) > k-11 {
		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
	}

	if boring.Enabled && random == boring.RandReader {
		bkey, err := boringPublicKey(pub)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		return boring.EncryptRSAPKCS1(bkey, msg)
	}
	boring.UnreachableExceptTests()

	// EM = 0x00 || 0x02 || PS || 0x00 || M
	em := make([]byte, k)
	em[1] = 2
	ps, mm := em[2:len(em)-len(msg)-1], em[len(em)-len(msg):]
	err := nonZeroRandomBytes(ps, random)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	em[len(em)-len(msg)-1] = 0
	copy(mm, msg)

	if boring.Enabled {
		var bkey *boring.PublicKeyRSA
		bkey, err = boringPublicKey(pub)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		return boring.EncryptRSANoPadding(bkey, em)
	}

	return encrypt(pub, em)
}

// DecryptPKCS1v15 decrypts a plaintext using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5.
// The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be as nil.
//
// Note that whether this function returns an error or not discloses secret
// information. If an attacker can cause this function to run repeatedly and
// learn whether each instance returned an error then they can decrypt and
// forge signatures as if they had the private key. See
// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey for a way of solving this problem.
func DecryptPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	if boring.Enabled {
		bkey, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		out, err := boring.DecryptRSAPKCS1(bkey, ciphertext)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, ErrDecryption
		}
		return out, nil
	}

	valid, out, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(priv, ciphertext)
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}
	if valid == 0 {
		return nil, ErrDecryption
	}
	return out[index:], nil
}

// DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey decrypts a session key using RSA and the padding scheme from PKCS #1 v1.5.
// The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be as nil.
// It returns an error if the ciphertext is the wrong length or if the
// ciphertext is greater than the public modulus. Otherwise, no error is
// returned. If the padding is valid, the resulting plaintext message is copied
// into key. Otherwise, key is unchanged. These alternatives occur in constant
// time. It is intended that the user of this function generate a random
// session key beforehand and continue the protocol with the resulting value.
// This will remove any possibility that an attacker can learn any information
// about the plaintext.
// See “Chosen Ciphertext Attacks Against Protocols Based on the RSA
// Encryption Standard PKCS #1”, Daniel Bleichenbacher, Advances in Cryptology
// (Crypto '98).
//
// Note that if the session key is too small then it may be possible for an
// attacker to brute-force it. If they can do that then they can learn whether
// a random value was used (because it'll be different for the same ciphertext)
// and thus whether the padding was correct. This defeats the point of this
// function. Using at least a 16-byte key will protect against this attack.
func DecryptPKCS1v15SessionKey(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte, key []byte) error {
	if err := checkPub(&priv.PublicKey); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	k := priv.Size()
	if k-(len(key)+3+8) < 0 {
		return ErrDecryption
	}

	valid, em, index, err := decryptPKCS1v15(priv, ciphertext)
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	if len(em) != k {
		// This should be impossible because decryptPKCS1v15 always
		// returns the full slice.
		return ErrDecryption
	}

	valid &= subtle.ConstantTimeEq(int32(len(em)-index), int32(len(key)))
	subtle.ConstantTimeCopy(valid, key, em[len(em)-len(key):])
	return nil
}

// decryptPKCS1v15 decrypts ciphertext using priv. It returns one or zero in
// valid that indicates whether the plaintext was correctly structured.
// In either case, the plaintext is returned in em so that it may be read
// independently of whether it was valid in order to maintain constant memory
// access patterns. If the plaintext was valid then index contains the index of
// the original message in em, to allow constant time padding removal.
func decryptPKCS1v15(priv *PrivateKey, ciphertext []byte) (valid int, em []byte, index int, err error) {
	k := priv.Size()
	if k < 11 {
		err = ErrDecryption
		return
	}

	if boring.Enabled {
		var bkey *boring.PrivateKeyRSA
		bkey, err = boringPrivateKey(priv)
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
		em, err = boring.DecryptRSANoPadding(bkey, ciphertext)
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
	} else {
		em, err = decrypt(priv, ciphertext, noCheck)
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
	}

	firstByteIsZero := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
	secondByteIsTwo := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 2)

	// The remainder of the plaintext must be a string of non-zero random
	// octets, followed by a 0, followed by the message.
	//   lookingForIndex: 1 iff we are still looking for the zero.
	//   index: the offset of the first zero byte.
	lookingForIndex := 1

	for i := 2; i < len(em); i++ {
		equals0 := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0)
		index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(lookingForIndex&equals0, i, index)
		lookingForIndex = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(equals0, 0, lookingForIndex)
	}

	// The PS padding must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two
	// bytes into em.
	validPS := subtle.ConstantTimeLessOrEq(2+8, index)

	valid = firstByteIsZero & secondByteIsTwo & (^lookingForIndex & 1) & validPS
	index = subtle.ConstantTimeSelect(valid, index+1, 0)
	return valid, em, index, nil
}

// nonZeroRandomBytes fills the given slice with non-zero random octets.
func nonZeroRandomBytes(s []byte, random io.Reader) (err error) {
	_, err = io.ReadFull(random, s)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	for i := 0; i < len(s); i++ {
		for s[i] == 0 {
			_, err = io.ReadFull(random, s[i:i+1])
			if err != nil {
				return
			}
			// In tests, the PRNG may return all zeros so we do
			// this to break the loop.
			s[i] ^= 0x42
		}
	}

	return
}

// These are ASN1 DER structures:
//
//	DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
//	  digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
//	  digest OCTET STRING
//	}
//
// For performance, we don't use the generic ASN1 encoder. Rather, we
// precompute a prefix of the digest value that makes a valid ASN1 DER string
// with the correct contents.
var hashPrefixes = map[crypto.Hash][]byte{
	crypto.MD5:       {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x0c, 0x06, 0x08, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x02, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x10},
	crypto.SHA1:      {0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14},
	crypto.SHA224:    {0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1c},
	crypto.SHA256:    {0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20},
	crypto.SHA384:    {0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30},
	crypto.SHA512:    {0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, 0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40},
	crypto.MD5SHA1:   {}, // A special TLS case which doesn't use an ASN1 prefix.
	crypto.RIPEMD160: {0x30, 0x20, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x28, 0xcf, 0x06, 0x03, 0x00, 0x31, 0x04, 0x14},
}

// SignPKCS1v15 calculates the signature of hashed using
// RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN from RSA PKCS #1 v1.5.  Note that hashed must
// be the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
// function. If hash is zero, hashed is signed directly. This isn't
// advisable except for interoperability.
//
// The random parameter is legacy and ignored, and it can be as nil.
//
// This function is deterministic. Thus, if the set of possible
// messages is small, an attacker may be able to build a map from
// messages to signatures and identify the signed messages. As ever,
// signatures provide authenticity, not confidentiality.
func SignPKCS1v15(random io.Reader, priv *PrivateKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte) ([]byte, error) {
	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
	if err != nil {
		return nil, err
	}

	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
	k := priv.Size()
	if k < tLen+11 {
		return nil, ErrMessageTooLong
	}

	if boring.Enabled {
		bkey, err := boringPrivateKey(priv)
		if err != nil {
			return nil, err
		}
		return boring.SignRSAPKCS1v15(bkey, hash, hashed)
	}

	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T
	em := make([]byte, k)
	em[1] = 1
	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
		em[i] = 0xff
	}
	copy(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
	copy(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)

	return decrypt(priv, em, withCheck)
}

// VerifyPKCS1v15 verifies an RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 signature.
// hashed is the result of hashing the input message using the given hash
// function and sig is the signature. A valid signature is indicated by
// returning a nil error. If hash is zero then hashed is used directly. This
// isn't advisable except for interoperability.
func VerifyPKCS1v15(pub *PublicKey, hash crypto.Hash, hashed []byte, sig []byte) error {
	if boring.Enabled {
		bkey, err := boringPublicKey(pub)
		if err != nil {
			return err
		}
		if err := boring.VerifyRSAPKCS1v15(bkey, hash, hashed, sig); err != nil {
			return ErrVerification
		}
		return nil
	}

	hashLen, prefix, err := pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash, len(hashed))
	if err != nil {
		return err
	}

	tLen := len(prefix) + hashLen
	k := pub.Size()
	if k < tLen+11 {
		return ErrVerification
	}

	// RFC 8017 Section 8.2.2: If the length of the signature S is not k
	// octets (where k is the length in octets of the RSA modulus n), output
	// "invalid signature" and stop.
	if k != len(sig) {
		return ErrVerification
	}

	em, err := encrypt(pub, sig)
	if err != nil {
		return ErrVerification
	}
	// EM = 0x00 || 0x01 || PS || 0x00 || T

	ok := subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[0], 0)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[1], 1)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-hashLen:k], hashed)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(em[k-tLen:k-hashLen], prefix)
	ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[k-tLen-1], 0)

	for i := 2; i < k-tLen-1; i++ {
		ok &= subtle.ConstantTimeByteEq(em[i], 0xff)
	}

	if ok != 1 {
		return ErrVerification
	}

	return nil
}

func pkcs1v15HashInfo(hash crypto.Hash, inLen int) (hashLen int, prefix []byte, err error) {
	// Special case: crypto.Hash(0) is used to indicate that the data is
	// signed directly.
	if hash == 0 {
		return inLen, nil, nil
	}

	hashLen = hash.Size()
	if inLen != hashLen {
		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: input must be hashed message")
	}
	prefix, ok := hashPrefixes[hash]
	if !ok {
		return 0, nil, errors.New("crypto/rsa: unsupported hash function")
	}
	return
}